

igion and politics combined similarly across Europe. Religious enemies, their hatreds fanned by confessional ideology, became political enemies, and vice versa, as people at odds with one another for social or political reasons tended to choose opposing sides religiously as well. In this way, Europe's religious divisions not only created new conflicts, they threw ideological fuel on the fires of existing ones. Competitions for power, wealth, or land became cosmic struggles between the forces of God and Satan. Inversely, the bonds of a common confession brought people together in equally powerful ways. When they cut across social or political lines, they could make friends of strangers or even former enemies. On every level, from the local to the international, co-religionists felt an impulse to make common cause with one another.

To Europe's rulers, then, the rise of confessionalism held out both perils and promises. A difference in religion could alienate their subjects from them and undermine their authority. As the French Wars of Religion demonstrated, to the horror of contemporaries, it could set citizen against fellow citizen and tear states apart in civil war. A shared religion, on the other hand, could bolster rulers' authority, binding their subjects to them and to one another more firmly. Given these starkly contrasting possibilities, it is no wonder rulers tried to impose religious uniformity on their territories. Their personal piety impelled many to do the same. Since the thirteenth century, the Catholic Church had asked them to swear they would "strive in good faith and to the best of their ability to exterminate in the territories subject to their jurisdiction all heretics pointed out by the Church."⁶ The division of Western Christendom gave them compelling new reasons to do so.

In its wake, Europe's rulers tried to make their personal choice of faith official for their state. Most succeeded, though, as we shall see, not all. Either way, the resulting confessional allegiance eventually became a defining aspect of political identity. Whether or not it initially had wide support, the allegiance was institutionalized and sank popular roots. In some essential and irreversible way, England became a Protestant country, Poland a Catholic one, Sweden Lutheran, the Dutch Republic Calvinist, and so forth. This fusion of religious and political identity, piety and patriotism, was (after confessionalism and the communal quest for holiness) the third great cause of religious intolerance in early modern Europe. Forged in the course of Europe's religious wars, it led both rulers and ordinary people to

equate orthodoxy with loyalty and religious dissent with sedition. It gave national politics and even foreign affairs the power to spark waves of religious riots as well as official persecution.

Cuius Regio?

From the moment the evangelical movement began to spread in Germany and Switzerland, princes and magistrates faced a momentous choice of whether to support it. It was a choice they felt bound to make not only for themselves but for all those subject to their authority. "For in matters concerning God's honor and the salvation of our citizenry and community," declared Nuremberg's city council, it bore ultimate responsibility. "As a duty of the office entrusted to them and upon pain of losing their souls," the councillors had an obligation "to provide for their subjects, over whom they are placed, not only in temporal . . . but also in spiritual [affairs] . . . that is, with the holy gospel and word of God, from which human souls and consciences live."⁷ The obligation was not new. As "Christian magistrates," they had always understood it as their duty, as their colleagues in Italy once declared "that we shall seek, before all [other] things, God's kingdom and works of divine virtue, and [that we] shall increase and promote divine service."⁸ Accordingly, in the previous century they had led their community in an intensive quest for "Heil," issuing moral regulations, coordinating charity, reforming schools, funding preacherhips, and cracking down—as best they could, given the clergy's broad autonomy—on clerical abuses. Now, with the Reformation, they also decided how Christianity would be practiced and professed in their city. Henceforth, they would appoint and dismiss Nuremberg's pastors, administer church finances, issue ordinances to replace canon law, and supervise religious life. For them the Reformation brought sweeping new powers to fulfill an old responsibility. It was an eminently satisfying change.

In the following years, rulers across Europe did the same as Nuremberg's magistrates: with pope and emperor impotent to stop them, they chose among faiths and imposed their choice on their subjects. In the process, they turned religious choice into an attribute of sovereignty; indeed, rulers such as Count Ortheinrich of the Palatinate called it the "highest" such attribute (*höchstes Regal*).⁹ In the empire, this novel power was rati-

fed legally by the Peace of Augsburg, signed in 1555. The famous catchphrase *cuius regio, eius religio* was coined decades later by a Lutheran jurist to summarize the central clauses of this treaty. "Cuius regio" meant that "the whose territory" it was had the right to impose his faith (Catholic or Lutheran) on his subjects, free from outside interference. If subjects dissented from their ruler's choice, they had only the right to emigrate (*ius emigrandi*). Sealing the defeat of Emperor Charles V, who abdicated his throne and retreated to a monastery, the Peace vested the German princes with the *ius reformandi*, the right to reform, and with it sweeping authority over religious affairs within their lands.

Württemberg

Whether established de jure or simply de facto, "cuius regio" offered Europe's rulers unprecedented opportunities to expand their power. The German duchy of Württemberg exemplifies how rulers could use these opportunities for state-building. It is in some respects an extreme example, for Württemberg was a Lutheran territory, and of all the confessional Lutheranism promoted the closest integration of church and state. In fact, it tended to incorporate the church into the structure of the state, turning it practically into a department of government. Württemberg was a pioneer in this regard, developing in the 1550s under Duke Christoph a "church order" or structure of ecclesiastic governance, that other Lutheran territories in Germany copied. At the top of this structure were two bodies, the Consistory and the Synod. Unlike Calvinist consistories in western Europe, Württemberg's was a single, centralized institution, based in the capital, Stuttgart. It consisted of theologians and jurists, all appointed directly by the duke. The jurists controlled church finances; the theologians made appointments to lower church offices, assigned pastors to parishes, and stood as highest doctrinal authority. Twice a year (four times, initially), the members of the Consistory joined four "general superintendents" appointed by the duke to form the Synod. The latter was in charge of disciplinary matters. General superintendents supervised twenty-three special superintendents, who in turn conducted parish visitations. Anyone who refused to take Communion or attend services in their parish church violated the law; if found guilty of heresy, they could be banished or im-

prisoned and their property could be confiscated. Pastors were required to report suspicious cases, along with those of "notorious" unrepentant sinners, to their superiors. Serious cases were passed up by the special to the general superintendents, and if necessary to the Synod.

Established by ducal edict, the structure was a model of bureaucracy. Comprehensive, it covered all Württembergers. Strictly hierarchic, it robbed the parishes of almost all autonomy and required a great quantity of paperwork (by the standards of the day) to flow up the chain of command. With the appointment of top church officials in his hands, it gave the duke firm control over the church. Since those officials also constituted one of two estates in Württemberg's territorial assembly, it also made the latter body more docile. The chief disadvantage of the structure, at least in the eyes of theologians like Jacob Andreae and his grandson Johann Valentin Andreae, was that it could not enforce morals very strictly. When members of their flock sinned, pastors could do little more than privately admonish the guilty parties and report them to the superintendent. In practice, the Synod was too distant and too busy to handle many cases, which were left to the discretion of local government officials. And that suited the latter just fine: for the time being, they preferred their unrivaled hegemony to moral rigor. Attitudes changed with the Thirty Years' War, whose horrors and depredations were widely interpreted as punishment for Germany's sins. The need to appease God in order to restore peace and prosperity tipped the balance of elite opinion, and in the 1640s authorities finally accepted Johann Valentin Andreae's proposal for the creation of local moral courts, called "Kirchenkonvente."

Andreae's proposal was inspired by his vision of an ideal Christian community, which he described in a work of utopian fiction entitled *Christianopolis*. At the center of this miniature city, surrounded by its symmetrical walls and buildings, embodiments of harmony and order, stood a temple—religion. The citizens of this holy "commonwealth" were of course fervent Lutherans. The judge who presided over them, wrote Andreae, "thinks that the best arrangement for a community is this, that it approximate as closely as possible to heaven; and since he is extremely pious he believes that the salvation of a community lies in the good disposition of God, while His wrath means its destruction. And so he exerts himself in this, that God may not be offended by the sins of the people, and may be appeased by the distinguishing marks of faith. . . . Nothing from Satan,

however small, is allowed in; and they have no fear of the growth of evil, for they root it out as quickly as possible."¹⁰ Christianopolis, then, was a theocracy: a society in which church and state cooperated to realize, as best they could, the kingdom of God on earth. In it, religious precepts and values took priority over secular concerns, serving as a blueprint for all spheres of life. Moved by an inner piety, its citizens obeyed freely the community's strict moral code; faith and compulsion joined to produce a perfect conformity to God's will. Far from unique to Andrae or to Lutheranism, this theocratic ideal was another aspect of confessionalism. In fact, Andrae drew his inspiration partly from Calvinist Geneva, which he visited in 1614; in his autobiography he gushed over the moral rigor he observed there.

Few were the cities, never mind territories, that lived up to this ideal. Certainly the morals courts never transformed Württemberg as thoroughly as Andrae hoped. They did, though, crack down on cursing, swearing, adultery, fornication, cardplaying, dancing, and other offenses long forbidden by law. With jurisdiction over education, charity, and public health as well, these local courts subjected peasants and townsmen to a new social discipline. Run jointly by church and secular officials, they not only gave institutional form to a religious ideal, they turned Württembergers into more obedient, orderly subjects, "civilizing" their behavior.

Religious reform, state-building, and social discipline were mutually dependent, mutually reinforcing processes in Württemberg. So interconnected were they that we can even speak of them as three aspects of a single, overarching process that was at once religious, political, and social. Called "confessionalization," this process was at work in many European lands in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.¹¹ If Württemberg underwent a classic process of confessionalization, though, it was not simply because the dukes willed it. Early in the Reformation, Lutheranism had gained a popular following in the duchy, so that Duke Christoph had broad support for his reforms. It was at the initiative of the estates that the 1559 Church Order was incorporated into statute law and declared unalterable. And it was only when local officials dropped their resistance that morals courts were formed. Like elsewhere in Europe, in Württemberg a crucial part of state-building involved forming strategic alliances with local power brokers. Rulers could not simply ignore the religious inclinations of their subjects, nor could they wipe away at a stroke the medieval heritage

of particularism. Those who tried courted disaster. For just as religious reform and state-building could fuse, so could religious dissent and political opposition. That is exactly what happened in three of Europe's great religious wars, the Dutch Revolt against Spain, the Thirty Years' War, and the English Civil War. In all three cases, rulers triggered massive revolts when they combined abrupt moves toward absolutist government with a crack-down on beliefs and practices widespread among their subjects.

The Netherlands

The confessionalizing initiatives of Philip II triggered the Dutch Revolt. In 1555 Philip inherited from his father Charles V the seventeen provinces of the Habsburg Netherlands. Charles had done his best to suppress Protestantism in them, but had never succeeded in stopping the flow of books, ideas, and religious refugees. Devoutly Catholic, Philip swore that he would not be a ruler over heretics. He also saw, and no one could really dispute, the need to revamp the administrative structure of the Catholic Church in the Netherlands. Woefully inadequate for pastoral care and oversight, four bishops presided there over a flock of almost three million people. Philip therefore had his Brussels advisors draft a plan known as the "new bishoprics scheme." Receiving papal approval in 1559, it increased the number of bishoprics to eighteen, strengthened their powers, and provided for two inquisitors in each bishopric. Not coincidentally, the plan brought church and government into line with one another by making the borders of the bishoprics contiguous with those of the Habsburg territories. Philip also obtained from the pope the right to appoint all bishops and archbishops. These prelates would take the place of more independent ones in the States of Brabant, the most powerful province. Philip went on to name several inquisitors as bishops. They exemplified the kind of fervent, efficient administrators Philip wanted for both church and state. In defense of Catholicism they did not hesitate to violate cherished local privileges such as the "jus de non evocando," the right of citizens to be tried for criminal offenses in a local court. The new bishoprics scheme would violate other privileges the Netherlanders claimed as well. It illustrates how Catholic reforms, like Protestant ones, could serve political and religious ends simultaneously.

In the 1560s a broad coalition of noblemen and burghers emerged in opposition to this plan. Crucially, Catholics as well as Calvinists, the leading Protestant group, joined the coalition. They shared many values and viewpoints as well as interests with their Protestant countrymen, and Philip's intolerant, confessional faith little resembled the Catholicism they had been raised in. Indeed, it would be difficult to classify many Netherlanders at the time as either Catholic or Protestant, for their piety combined a variety of influences. In 1566 this coalition forced regent Margaret of Parma to suspend the antiheresy laws. Protestants took advantage of the opportunity to hold public sermons, and in August bands of them began to commit acts of iconoclasm, destroying altars and images in hundreds of churches. Philip's response was equally extreme: he dispatched the Duke of Alba at the head of Europe's biggest, best-trained army to restore order. The duke fulfilled his orders with a vengeance, implementing the decrees of the Council of Trent along with the new bishoprics scheme, executing Protestants, abrogating privileges, and imposing heavy new taxes without the assent of provincial estates. These acts, and the predatory behavior of the Spanish soldiers, alienated more Netherlanders than ever before. Thus, when rebels who had taken refuge abroad, known as "Sea Beggars," launched in 1572 an invasion of Holland and Zeeland, few burghers resisted; many welcomed them with open arms.

For most Netherlanders, the Revolt was a struggle for freedom, both political and religious—freedom from "tyranny" and from what they called the "Spanish inquisition." Around this cause Netherlanders could rally, regardless of religion. For Calvinists, though, the Revolt was something far grander and more desperate: a struggle of good against evil, Christ against Antichrist. For them, fighting Philip was an act of piety on which depended their salvation, as well as their very survival. They could admit no compromise or defeat. Meanwhile, Catholics who supported the Revolt found themselves taking sides with Protestants against the champion of their own faith. Viewed from a confessional perspective, their stance made no sense. Philip concluded that their commitment to Catholicism must be insincere; Calvinists concluded the same about their commitment to the Revolt. In fact, few Catholics in Holland or Zeeland favored Philip's victory in the war, and most of these "malcontents" eventually fled. Nothing, though, could break the association of Catholicism with Philip's regime. Calvinists claimed that Catholics' religious allegiance would drive them to

betray their homeland. In the perilous, often desperate straits in which the Dutch found themselves, this false accusation found wide acceptance. Fear of subversion—of a fifth column of Catholic traitors ready to throw open the gates to besieging Spanish troops—gripped cities. Calvinists claimed in addition that God would not grant the rebels military success unless they fulfilled their sacred obligation to eradicate Catholicism. As one group of soldiers put it, justifying a rampage in Delft, their leader William of Orange "could not be victorious as long as the aforesaid [priests] persisted with their idolatry in the town."¹² Reluctantly, in 1573 the estates of Holland and Zeeland outlawed Catholic worship.

The same dynamic repeated itself in other provinces after they joined the Revolt in 1576. Every one of them intended initially to maintain the monopoly of the Roman Catholic Church, but the association of Catholicism with loyalty to Philip generated irresistible pressures. Pope Gregory XIII added to them in 1578 when he threatened Catholics with excommunication if they supported the Revolt. The decisive event came in March 1580, when the Catholic Count of Rennenberg, stadholder of the northeastern provinces, abandoned the Revolt, calling on his fellow Catholics to rise up against its leaders. "Rennenberg's reason" seemed to confirm Protestants' worst fears about the disloyalty of Dutch Catholics. In scores of cities from Friesland to Holland, a wave of iconoclastic rioting erupted, as Protestants demanded the immediate suspension of Catholic worship. By the end of 1581, Catholic worship was illegal throughout the rebel provinces.

In the end, the seven provinces north of the Maas and Weal rivers abjured their allegiance to Spain and formed the United Provinces of the Netherlands, also known as the Dutch Republic. Thanks to its association with patriotism, Calvinism became the official religion of the newly independent country, and those who served in government were required, at least in their official capacity, to support it. ~~It was a significant part of events that gave that the southern provinces that remained to the Spanish side had had more Calvinists at the beginning of the Revolt than had northern ones. Even in the 1580s it was estimated that only one in ten Hollanders were members of the Reformed Church. It comes then as no surprise that Dutch society was never thoroughly Calvinized. To the contrary, no other land in seventeenth-century Europe would have as many different churches and sects, and advocates of toleration would hail the Republic as~~